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IV 
I. CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Defendant/Respondent Chamberlin, D.O. ("Chamberlain") agrees with 
Plaintiff/Appellant Thomas R. Taylor ("Taylor") statement nature of the case. 
s statement treatment the Respondent's gave him set forth in his 
"Nature of Case" subsection are allegations at point and not been 
or determined. 
Course 
Taylor his court on 
January 24, 2011, Taylor filed a of Claim with the Ida.~o 
proceedings pursuant to I.C. § 6-1001 et. seq. R. 
11. R. Vol. I, p. 31. On 
Medicine, commencing 
I, p. 31. The prelitigation panel 
its advisory opinion on April 19,2011. R. Vol. I, pp. 31-32. On August 24,2011, 
Chamberlain filed a motion to dismiss Taylor's claims 
complaint pursuant to LR.C.P. 4(a)(2). R. Vol. I, p. 49. 
failure to timely serve the summons and 
Taylor opposed Chamberlain's motion. R. Vol. I, p. 39, 105. Taylor also filed a Cross-
Motion to Stay Case Nunc Pro Tunc or Alternatively, to Enlarge Time to Serve Defendants under 
LR.C.P. 6(b) contemporaneously with his opposition to Chamberlain's motion. R. Vol. I, p. 36. 
The District Court denied Taylor's motion and dismissed his claims against Chamberlain in 
an Opinion and Order entered on September 29, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 140. Based on the holding of 
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Ruddv. 1 Court that the case was not automatically 
stayed pending a resolution of the prelitigation proceedings. R. VoL I, p. 137-38. With respect to 
Taylor's motion to stay nunc pro tunc, the District Court held as follows: 
Plaintiff s argument that this case is different from the Rudd case because no stay was 
requested in Rudd also fails as the stay requested by Plaintiff was not requested until 
after the 4(a)(2) six-month had passed and EIRMC had filed its motion 
to dismiss. It is clear the case law that six month period following the filing 
of the complaint should be the focus court's fu"1d no stay was requested 
during 
VoL I, 1 
respectto Taylor's 6(b) monon contention that he had met the good cause 
sta.lldard in Rule 4(a)(2), the District Court held the following: 
Although the Court is not pursuaded that the actions of Plaintiff meet the less 
stringent excusable neglect standard of Rule 6(b), that matter does not have to be 
decided by this Court. A specific statute, and by analogy a specific rule of civil or 
criminal procedure, controls over a more general statute when there is any conflict 
between the two or when the general statute is vague or ambiguous. Rule 4(a)(2) is 
a specific rule that is to be applied strictly. Although Rule 6(b) and Rule 1 open the 
door to grant relief for negligence to comply if deemed excusable, fostering Rule 
1 (ars favoring ofliberality and cases being decided on the merits, the more specific 
and stringent restriction of Rule 4(a)(2) must override. This Court cannot allow the 
Plaintiff to shift the good cause inquiry of Rule 4(a)(2) into a less stringent excusable 
neglect inquiry simply by filing a motion to stay nunc pro tunc after the six-month 
requirement has passed and EIRMC has filed a motion to dismiss. Therefore, the 
good cause inquiry under Rule 4(a)(2) is the standard that must be met in this case 
and the Court finds that the actions of Plaintiff do not meet that standard. Plaintiff 
made absolutely no attempt to serve EIRMC or Chamberlain in the six months after 
filing the Complaint. The argument that Plaintiff relied on a reasonable 
interpretation ofldaho Code § 6-1006 is not supported by the statute's plain language 
or its accompanying case law, both of which should have been readily accessible to 
Plaintiff. 
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R. VoL I, p. 139-40 
On October 3, 1, the District Court entered a judgment dismissing Taylor's 'v"""U.U.> against 
Chamberlain without prejudice. R. Vol. 1, p. 144. Taylor 
14, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 1 December 19, 2011, 
his notice of appeal on November 
District Court entered an amenclea 
judgment dismissing all defendants, including Jacobs, without R. Vol. I, p. 151. 
Taylor filed an amended notice of appeal on January 
C. Statement 
Taylor filed this matter on 
on January 24, ] ] , filed an UU'JU,"_(..I.U 
R. Vol. L p. 155. 
2011. R. Vol. I, p. 7. 
for a "',,-'kCH.o'U screening pa..'1el. 
days 
Vol. 
I, p. 31, 50. The issued its decision on April 19, 2011. Vol. I, p. 31-32,50. On August 5, 
11, Taylor attempted to serve Chamberlain by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint with 
receptionist at his office. R. Vol. I, p. 53. Chamberlain's receptionist was not authorized 
to accept service on behalf. Id. Chamberlain filed a Special Appearance and Motion to Dismiss 
12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5) for failure to effect service of process on August 24,2011. Taylor served 
Chamberlain again September 5, 2011. R. Vol. I, p. 119. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did Taylor's failure to serve Chamberlain within the six-month time period required 
by I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) constitute good cause or excusable neglect? 
2. Does a stay entered pursuant to I.C. § 6-1006 toll the six month time period for 
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or process? 
3. Is Chamberlain "J..lL" ..... '-' to <;;tTr,rn""J fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to 1. C. § 12-
121 and 1.A.R. 40 and 4 ? 
ARGUMENT 
CORRECT IN 
GOOD CAUSE STANDARD. 
RULE4(a)(2) AND ITS 
contends that the Court when it failed to Rule 6(b) and its 
U'"'''."''''''' standard. contends that Rule not Rule the district 
court applied, is the more specific Rule 1 (a) favors a resolution on 
merits whenever possible and to that end the Court have 6(b)'s excusable 
standard. Taylor's contentions are erroneous. The District Court was correct in applying 
It is the more specific as a mandatory rule, Rule 1 can not alter compliance 
1. is the Specific Rule and Should Be Applied in this Case. 
"A specific statute, and by analogy a specific rule of civil or criminal procedure, controls over 
a more general statute when there is any conflict between the two or when the general statute is 
vague or ambiguous." Ausman v. State, 124 Idaho 839, 842 (1993) (citations omitted). 
The two rules at issue in this case are Rule 4(a)(2) and Rule 6(b). Rule 4(a)(2) states: 
If a service of the SUJIlJIlons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within six 
(6) months after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such 
service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made within 
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that period, action shall be JHJlLO':',-,U as to defendant without prejudice upon 
the court's own initiative with 14 days to such party or upon motion. 
LR.C.P. 6(b) states: 
\Vhen by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is 
required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the parties, by VvTItten 
stipulation, which does not disturb the orderly dispatch of business or the 
convenience of the court, filed in the action, or after the expiration the 
specified period, may enlarge the period, or court for cause shown may at any 
in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged 
request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed 
or as extended by previous order or made after the PV''\'T,n,r,n 
specified period permit act to where the failure to act was the result of 
,",A\~U.:t'UUJ, ... negJect; but time may not be extended taking any under rules 
52(b), 59(b), (d), (e), and to extent and under the 
stated 
discussed general rules, specifically I.R.C.P. 60(b )(1), in Ausman v. State, 
) is a general rule of civil procedure by wpjch a court, upon motion 
such terms that are just, exercises its discretion to relieve a party of a judgment 
for mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. It is not specific as 
to what kinds of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect must be shown 
order the moving party to be granted reliefby the court. Nor does the rule state 
that it applies to any specific area civil law or to any specific types of judgments 
or orders. This rule is simply a general rule of civil procedure, and whether or not a 
court grants a motion under this rule is entirely discretionary. Johnston v. Pascoe, 
100 Idlli~o 414, 420, 599 P.2d 985,991 (1979): Thomas v. Thomas, 119 Idaho 709, 
711,809 P.2d 1188,1190 (Ct.App.1991). 
Ausman, 124 Idaho at 843. 
I.R.C.P. 6(b) is analogous to LR.C.P. 60(b)(1). Like 60(b)(l), Rule 6(b) is a rule of civil 
procedure by which a court, upon motion, exercises its discretion to grant a party additional time to 
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npf""trl,rr'r) a procedural task excusable neglect is shown. It does not state that it applies to 
specific area of civil law or to any specific types of procedural tasks. Just like Rule 60(b)( 1), 
is simply a general rule of civil procedure, and whether or not a court grfu'1ts a motion under this 
rule is entirely discretionary. 
In contrast, Rule deals specifically and explicitly failure to serve a complaint 
the required six UnJH"H time period. It states precisely what a court must do if a party 
to effect service UV.J,'-'UL a of show good cause. is no discretion. this case, 
requested an extension of time servlce Rule However, 4(a)(2) 
addresses a court can an b'-HJiV'U of time service of process -
a showing good cause. Taylor's requested relief is specifically addressed in Rule 4(a)(2). 
it is specific in this case. 
Taylor's application 6(b) to to effect service would eviscerate Rule 
It Court Taylor's reasoning, a plaintiff could file a complaint and, without serving 
defendants, wait six month period expired and then simply file a Rule 6(b) motion to 
gain additional time to service with just a showing of excusable neglect. 
2. Rule 4(a)(2) is Mandatory and Therefore Rule 1 (a) Can not Alter 
Compliance. 
Taylor contends that Rule 1 (a) obligated the District Court to harmonize Rule 4(a)(2) and 
Rule 6(b) in a vv'ay that promotes justice, fairness, and resolution on the merits. In support Taylor 
notes that under Rule 1 (a) the rules "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and 
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inexpensive determination every action and proceeding." Taylor goes on to quote the following 
language Bunn v. Bunn, 99 Idaho 710 (1978): 
The object of statutes and rules regulating procedure in the courts is to promote the 
administration of justice. Those statutes and rules which fix the time within which 
procedural rights are to be asserted are intended to expedite the disposition of causes 
to the end that justice will not be denied by inexcusable and unnecessary delay. But, 
except as to those which are mandatory or jurisdictional, procedural regulations 
should not be so applied as to defeat their primary purpose, that is, the disposition of 
causes upon their substantial merits delay or prejudice. 
Id at 711 (quoting Stoner v. Turner, 73 117, 121 (1952») L!JLH~JLJ added). while 
should not be UULJU\..,U so prevent causes from being decided on the merits, 
to this principle. As Court explained the decision, Rule 1 
compliance is mandatory aIld jurisdictional." Id at 712. 
Taylor goes to great L~U."'CLLJ to convince this court that 4(a)(2) is not mandatory 
or However, clearly and explicitly decided that "Rule 4(a)(2) is 
in mandatory language, dismissal where a party does not comply, absent a 
of good cause." Elliot v. __ Idaho __ , 271 P.3d 678, 686 (2012) (quoting 
Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,347 (1997)). "The purpose of Rule 4(a)(2) is to require 
the plaintiff to promptly serve the defendant(s)." ld at 686. 
Rule 4(a)(2) is also jurisdictional. "Service of process is the due process mechanism that 
vests a court with jurisdiction over a person, with the power to require such person to comply with 
the court's orders." McGloon v. Gyt.ynn, 140 Idaho 727,730, 100 P.3d 621, 624 (2004). Failure to 
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serve a party six months of filing complaint constitutes improper service deprives 
the court of jurisdiction and renders any judgment unenforceable. "[W]here a party has not been 
served process or was improperly served with process, a..!1y judgment against such party is void." 
Thiel v. Stradley, 118 Idaho 86, 87 (1990) (citations omitted). 
Thus, to mandatory and jurisdictional nature, Rule 1 (a)' s directive to construe the 
of Civil Procedure liberally can not alter or save Taylor from his to comply Rule 
4(a)(2). As a District Court was not under 1 "to harmonize 4(a)(2) 
and " 
B. TAYLOR DID NOT SHOW GOOD CAlJSE. 
district court proceedings Taylor contended that even if Rule 4(a)(2)'s good cause 
was the applicable standard, his failure to serve Chamberlain within Rule 4(a)(2)'s six 
npn{),{l was justified by good cause. good cause amounts to the fact that he 
had more time to serve this belief was reasonable because it was 
on the language Idaho Code § 6-1 " R. Vol. I, p. 111. 
The District Court found that Taylor's argument that he relied on a reasonable interpretation 
of 1. C. § 6-1006 was "not supported by the statute's plain language or its accompanying case law, 
both of which should have been readily accessible to [Taylor]." R. Vol L p. 140. The District Court 
also found that Taylor "made absolutely no attempt to serve ... Chamberlain in the six months after 
filing the Complaint." R. Vol. I, p. 140. The District Court was correct in finding that Taylor did 
8 - RESPONDENT DAVID CHA.MBERLAIN, D.O.'s BRIEF ON APPEAL 
not show good cause for to serve Chamberlain. 
Rule 4(a)(2) imposes the burden of demonstrating good cause on the party who failed to 
timely service. Sammis v. AIagnetek Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346 (1997). "Rule 4(a)(2) is 
couched in mandatory language, requiring dismissal where a party does not comply, absent a 
showing of good cause." at 347. It has been abundantly clear for quite some time in this State 
that Rule 4(a)(2) win be applied strictly. Rudd v. Merritt, 138 Idaho 526, 533 (2003). This court 
held: 
There is no bright-line test determining whether good cause exists. Martin v. 
Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372,375,987 P.2d 284,287 (l "[W]hether legal excuse has 
shown is a matter for judicial based upon the facts and 
circumstances in each case." id. The focus of the good cause inquiry is on the 
six -month time period the filing of the "If a plaintiff fails to 
make any attempt at service within the time period rule, it is likely that a court 
find no of good cause." Jd. at 377,987 P.2d at 289; see also Campbell 
v. Reagan, 144 Ida.l)o 159 P.3d 891, 894 (2007). Courts look to factors outside 
of including sudden illness, catastrophe, or evasion of 
service ofprocess.lv1artin, 133 Idaho at 377,987 P.2d at 289. Lack of prejudice is 
irrelevant to the at 375, 987 at 287. 
Harrison v. Ed. of Profl of the Idaho State Ed. of_Med., 145 Idaho 179, 183 (2008). 
This Court has also determined that there are other facts that do not constitute good cause for 
faili.Tlg to serve the summons and complaint with the six -month time period required by Rule 4( a )(2) 
and are therefore irrelevant in determining good cause. The irrelevant factors include (1) time bar 
if dismissed, (2) lack of prejudice to defendants, (3) defendant's knowledge of the pending litigation, 
(4) pending proceedings before the prelitigation screening panel, and (5) timing of the motion to 
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dismiss v. 271 at 687-88. 
this case, the District Court l.VUuu. and it is undisputed, that Taylor failed to make any 
service on Dr. Chamberlain six month time following the filing of the 
vV1HV'U.UH. Under Harrison, supra. this fact alone should prevent this Court from finding that Taylor 
to a 
made a of good cause, 
§ 
s claimed excuse not serving Dr. Chamberlain because reasonably relied upon 
language and he had more to serve Chamberlain" amounts 
had more to serve Dr. 
was [v. 138 526 (2003)]case," 
1, p. 43. The Rudd as 
v. Bjornson., 115 Idaho 165, 
allegedly harmed by medical 
P.2d 676 (1988), this Court held that a party 
could commence a civil lawsuit before 
screening paneL Idaho Code § 6-1001 does not 
H'V'-'-LV~L malpractice lawsuit because it is filed before the 
commencement of the proceedings. Once the Plaintiffs filed 
this lawsuit. however, Rule 4(a)(2) required that thev serve the summons and 
complaint upon the Defendants within six months after the complaint was filed. 
* * * * 
The Plaintiffs contend that Idaho Code §§ 6-1005 and 6-1006 tolled the running of 
the six-month period within which the summons and complaint were required to be 
served. Idaho Code § 6-1005 simply provides for the tolling of the statute of 
limitations. There is nothing in the wording of the statute that could be 
construed as tolling the running of tbe period within which the summons and 
complaint must be sen"ed after a lawsuit is filed. There is likewise nothing in 
Idaho Code § 6-1006 that tolls the running of tbe period within which the 
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summons and must be served. the statute authorizes the 
court to stay civil proceedings until the screening panel renders its 
opinion, Moss v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho 165, 765 P.2d 676 ( 988), the Plaintiffs in the 
instant case did not seek any such stay. 
at 530-31 (emphasis added); see also Elliot v. Verska, __ Idaho __ ,271 P.3d 678, 687 
12). 
Taylor contends that fact "that he was unaware of the outlier Rudd case should not be 
against " R. L 43. However, it not an outlier or archaic decision. It was 
H"'V~~U years after it is listed in the Notes and Decisions 
both § 6-1005 and § 6-] 006 in the and Michie versions of the Idaho Code 
and in Judicial Decisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
lack of awareness about the Rudd decision is even more egregious when one considers that 
he was represented by two firms and at least 3 attorneys. 
This held that "ignorance goes excusable 
neglect," Sammis, 130 at 347, and to be aware of the requirements or procedural 
wles does not constitute excusable neglect." Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 393 (1990). Given 
that Taylor's mistake of law does not even constitute excusable neglect, it cannot meet the higher 
good cause standard. The District Court was therefore correct in determining that Taylor failed to 
show good cause for failing to serve Chamberlain within the six month time period Rule 4(a)(2) 
prescribes. 
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TAYLOR HAS SHOWN EXCUSABLE l'I'EGLECT. 
Even Court were to conclude that the District should have applied Rule 6(b) 
its accompanyLl1g excusable neglect standard, Taylor has not shown that his failure to timely 
serve Dr. Chamberlain was product of excusable neglect. 
"The conduct constituting excusable neglect must be which would be expected of a 
reasonably prudent person same circumstances." LeaseFirst v. Burns, 131 Idaho 158, 953 
(1998). seeking relief to excusable neglect. See 
Co. v. 951) that under Rule 60(b), the burden 
IS the party seeking to UU'~Hi'vUL """·':l"t~·ri to bring themselves within 




surrounding same." Orange Transp. ,71 
1. Taylor's Mistake of Lml' Does Excusable Neglect. 
As discussed above, reason failing to serve Dr. Chamberlain is a HH.>U,u',,, 
excuse. This has routinely held mistake of law or ignorance of procedural 
requirements goes beyond excusable neglect. See Sammis, 130 Idaho at 347 (holding that 
to be aware of the requirements or procedural rules does not constitute excusable neglect. "); Golay 
v. Loomis, 118 Idaho at 387 ("failure to be aware of the requirements or procedural rules does not 
constitute excusable neglect. "). 
Taylor relies upon Schraufoagel v. Quinowski, 113 Idaho 753 eCt. App. 1987) and Stirm v. 
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1 1046 App.l support hJs contention that there may be instances 
where mistake law can amount to excusable neglect. According to Taylor, if there was any case 
in which a mistake oflaw may constitute excusable neglect, this is it because 1. e. § 6-1006 and Moss 
strongly suggest that a stay oflitigation pending the resolution of preiitigation screening proceedings 
is automatic. 
s erroneous reading of 
§ 6-1005 states that 
ULlUU"U'JI,. statute oflimitations be 
such a panel and for 
§ 1006 and lvioss is not excusable under the 
a prelitigation screening application is filed "the 
and not be deemed to IlL'l during the time such a claim 
days thereafter." provides only an 
uu,eVHIU"'y VeIHIU,"- of the statute oflimitations and does not mention or require at! action by the district 
court. Contrast this language with 1. e. § 6-1006, states 
courts baving jurisdiction of such claims shall 
"the district court or other 
proceedings in the interest of the 
conduct of such proceedings before the " The difference in the 
suggests that a stay of proceedings is not automatic 
§ 6-1006 strongly 
the LVLHllcc,"- of the statute of limitations 
in § 6-1005 but that the district court must take some affirmative action in order for the proceedings 
to be stayed. 
Taylor's contention that ~Moss "strongly suggests" that a stay in proceedings is automatic 
under I.e. § 6-1006 because }vioss does not mention a request for a stay anywhere is also without 
merit. Wnile lvioss does not explicitly mention that a stay was requested, it is apparent from the 
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stay was not automatic requested.] First, the }vfoss Court stated 
"under I.C. § 6-1006, district court is vested with authority to stay civil proceedings until the 
prelitigation screening panel renders its advisory opinion." ~Moss, 115 Idaho at 167. If a stay is 
aU1Wrnm]C, there is no need to vest the district court v-ith authority to issue a stay_ 
court that it '"[found] no error the district court's decision to stay 
proceedings (emphasis clearly suggests that a request 
to the district response to the motion to Uch'HU.Ju filed 
staving the 
. ~ In this case, at the very least, Taylor 
the court the status of the DrCICe(~QlIlgS before it 
proceedings. 
stated clearly there is nothing in I.e. § 6-1005 that could be 
construed as C~U~H'" ~'~"UU"Eo of the period a SUITJilons and complaint must sen'ed 
a lawsuit is It also makes it order for the trial court to civil 
proceedings, the party must request such a stay. 138 Idaho at 530-31. noted above, 
Rudd was decided nearly fifteen years after Moss is not an outlier or archaic decision. This, 
along with the fact that Taylor claims to have been unaware of Rudd despite being represented by 
two law firms makes his conduct inexcusable. 
] There is no statement the decision indicating a party involved in the case did not 
request a stay. 
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2. Diligently in his Efforts to Serve Chamberlain. 
This Court has held that "if a plaintiff fails to make any attempt at service within the time 
period of the rule, it is likely that a court \vill find no showing of good cause." Harrison, supra. 145 
at 183. This Court has likewise held that negJect is not excusable if it is the product 
or unreasonable " See, Jonsson v. Oxborrow, 141 Idaho 635, 639 n.2 (2005) 
a former """"lUI,~ 73 Idaho at 121 (party asserting excusable neglect must 
acted 
It is not "IT,>rn,,,, to serve Chamberlain v.rithin the six mAn.", 
not act nrrYrYlnTI and diligently and his 
servIce was u.H!"~a.~IJH Taylor waited until July 12, 11 to have the court issue a 
subpoena and then waited on or August 5, 20 II-more than two weeks after the 
month deadline of July 20, 11--to attempt service upon Dr. Chamberlain. Moreover, the LUlUHIES,;) 
of the prelitigation screening panel were issued on 15, 1. meaning that Taylor still waited 
nearly three and a half months after the panel's findings were issued and two and half months after 
a 30 day moratorium under I.C. § 6-1006 expired to attempt to serve Chamberlain.2 
Taylor failed to make any attempt of service on Chamberlain during the six month time 
period for service under LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) and he did not act diligently. Further, this reason for his 
2 It is important to note that Taylor's first service of process on Chamberlain was 
improper and he waited approximately one more month to serve Chamberlain despite 
Chamberlain filing his Motion to Dismiss under Rule 4(a)(2). 






MOTION TO STAY 
Taylor contends that IS no 
timing 




the conduct of such 
(emphasis 
excuse. therefore can not show 
NOT ERR IN DENYING TAYLOR'S 
or case law that imposes a U,-''''UL.lLl'' for requesting 
to I.e. § 6-1006 should be Taylor's 
for the timing of a request for a 
party shall commence or prosecute 
to the panel and district or other courts 
.. u.U.U.l" shall stay proceedings in interest 
the panel. 
vested to stay 
proceedings pursuant to I.e. § 6-1006 if it is the of the proceedings, i.e., 
if it benefits the purpose of the proceedings and paneL 
The stated purpose of the pre-litigation panel is "to receive evidence concerning the 
plaintiff s claim and at the close of the proceedings provide the parties its comments and 
observations with respect to the dispute." James v. Buck, 111 Idaho 708, 709 (1986). The express 
legislative intent behind the pre-litigation statutes is "to encourage nonlitigation resolution of claims 
against physicians and hospitals." S.L. 1976, ch. 278, § 1. For this purpose, I.e. § 6-1005 tolls the 
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~~"JU~'~~,,~ statute H"AH'",al malpractice the pendency of a claim 
before the pre-litigation panel to "encourag[ e] consideration of claims informally and without the 
necessity § 6-1005. 
Thus, a stay is appropriate and authorized it were to encourage the nonlitigation 
resolution claims against physicians and hospitals or 
process. 30 day the issuance of the 
6-1 furthers 
with guidance to 
a to 
moratorium expired does not further purpose 
true in this case where Taylor only seeks a stay nunc 
aid prelitigation screening 
decision set forth in §§ 6-1005 and 
to review the potential claims 
or proceed with litigation. 
has been issued and the 30 day 
pre-litigation statutes. T11is is especially 
tunc not to provide an OPPOrtlLTJity to 
resolve his '-'l<CHHIJ parameters of the L .... '''"U'-'H process but instead to give more 
to serve the complaint and to proceed 
litigation statute's stated purpose. Moreover. Taylor 
litigation - the exact opposite of the pre-
motion to stay only after the time to 
serve under Rule 4(a)(2) had expired and Dr. Chamberlain had filed his motion to dismiss. 
Further, allowing a stay to be entered nunc pro tunc after the panel issues its decision only 
serves to prolong litigation and create uncertainty and confusion. Moreover, if a court were required 
to grant a stay regardless of when it was requested, I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) would be nullified and rendered 
meaningless. plaintiff could wait to effect service until long after the six months set forth in 
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consequences. could simply file 
a mCHlcon to stay nunc pro tunc under § 6-1 the six months expired, and, according to 
Taylor's arQ'Ulllenl, the court would required to grant the motion. 
T ay]or also contends that a stay tunc at is consistent with Idaho's 
'-UUH.:ni'-'U goal of resolving cases on their However, Idaho a clearly established policy 
a plaintiff to serve defend3-nts with the summons complaint. Plaintiff s 
"rrrHrYlpnT would obviously and is at odds It is also ad odds the 
of the pre-litigation statutes is to encourage resolution without LHiiSU..'.VH. 
court's IT'Ir,Y"'.,, to nunc tunc was 
E. A STAY PURSUA.i""T TO I.e. 6-1 
PERIOD FOR SERVICE OF 
WOULD NOT TOLL THE TIME 
SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT. 
Taylor contends that if a stay was requested and granted 1. C. S 6-1006 the stav would v ., 
4(a)(2)'s service deadline. However, this Court has previously pointed out that 
Idaho Code § 6-1005 simply provides for tolling of the statute of limitations. 
There is nothing in the wording of the statute could be construed as tolling the 
running of the period within which the summons and complaint must be served after 
a lawsuit is filed. There is likewise nothing in Idaho Code §.6-1006 that tons the 
running of the period within which the summons and complaint must be served. 
Ruddv .• \1erritt, 138 Idaho 526,531 (2003) (emphasis added). 
Thus, unlike I.e. § 6-1005, wherein the legislature explicitly provided for the tolling of the 
statute of limitations, there is nothing to suggest that the legislature contemplated a tolling of the 
time for serving a summons and complaint. Surely if the legislature intended to toll the time for 
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service it could HH.'.tU~"'-'''' an additional provision 
language I.e. § 1006. It did not. 
This Court has ruled that a plaintiff can 
proceedings before prelitigation panel in to 
Idaho P.3d 678, 687 12 ) (quoting 
§ 6-1005 or specific tolling 
a complaint prior to the completion of 
the statute oflimitations. Elliot v. Verska, 
v. Bjornson, 115 Idaho at 167). 
However, it is not that a f-lH.lCUV.LU, a medical malpractice complaint prior to the 
completion of proceedings before the panel to bar of the statute 
"because statute limitations is tolled for a screernng 
time claim is pending thereafter." Id. at 
687 rnlf,nrH, Convl'ay v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 146 (2005). a stay 6-1006 would 
only encourage plaintiff s to file complaints before the completion of prelitigation proceedings and 
ignore the and policy of Idaho Code § 005. 
In addition, this Court "has never held service of process cannot be accomplished while 
a matter is pending before the pre litigation screening paneL" Elliot v. Verska, 271 P.3d at 687. 
However, if a plaintiff chooses not to take advantage of the tolling provisions the legislature 
provided in Idaho Code § 6-1005 and elects to file a complaint prior to completion of the 
prelitigation proceedings "they [are] required by Rule 4(a)(2) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
to serve the summons and complaint upon the Defendants within six months." Rudd, 138 Idaho at 
533. 
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a can to commence a 
instead of using the tolling provisions in Code § 6-1 
to toll the statute of limitations 
doing so comes with the additional 
requirement that service by effectuated. is how it should be. If service purSUllilt to 
LR.C.P. 4(a)(2) were not jJH .. ua'CAH would be "",-rlD,rt the additional and unintended 
advantage of having time for service under LR.C.P. 
to a complaint than use the advlli'1tages for it 
§. 6-1005. 
Requiring a jJHOLHi'CLLL to serve the summons and vJJIHjJ'HHHC" SIX mcmU1S if 
to a 
purpose of Rule 
Verska, 271 P.3d at 
is also ,",VL.hJhJC,","iC 
"to require plaintiff to ,...,.',"",nth serve defendant." Elliot v. 
It is also consistent with this Court's rulings that "Rule 4(a)(2) is couched 
mandatory language, requiring dismissal where a does not comply, absent a showing of good 
cause," Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho at 347, and that "the Rule will be applied strictly." 
Rudd, 138 Idaho at 533. light of the abundant case law and clear language of Rule 4(a)(2), Taylor 
should not now be heard to complaint that it is unfair to require him to seek a stay or additional time 
to effectuate service before the mandatory six-month time had expired. 
Taylor contends that a stay should toll the time for service because it would be consistent 
with the purpose of the pre-litigation statutes of encouraging nonlitigation resolutions of disputes. 
However, the legislature explicitly set forth which provisions it deemed necessary to further the 
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purpose of pre-litigation statutes § time for service was not 
included Idaho Code § 6- 005 nor is it provided in § 6-1006. See Rudel, 138 Idaho at 526 
H'J",",U.'''- that "there is likewise nothing Idaho Code § 6-1006 that the running of the period 
which the summons and complaint must be served."). The legislattlre' s failure to do so when 
it have donse so is evidence that .,,-,,au,,,, the time for effecting service was not a provision the 
deemed necessary to further the purpose statutes. 
It seems more than a bit Taylor is now urging to expand the and 
of the prelitigation statutes he a complaint 
CU.l'~"'Hi.:o:, LU'\..,I..U-"UL negligence u.""UU,C)e betlam prior to U!JIJLH.UCJVH for a prelitigation 
scri~enmQ. panel. 
CaAMBERLAI~ ENTITLED TO A TTO~~EY'S FEES AND COSTS O~ 
APPEAL. 
Under 1. C. § 12-121 fees are to be awarded to the prevailing party on appeal when the Court 
IS with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Rudd, 138 Idaho at 533. In this instance, in light of the 
unambiguous holdings in Rudd and Elliot and the clear language ofLR.C.P. 4(a)(2) and case law 
requiring strict application of the six month service deadline, Taylor's filing and pursuit of this 
appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, and without foundation. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
I.R.c.P. 4(a)(2) is couched in mandatory language and is the specific rule to be applied in this 
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case. not err it accompanying good cause It is 
clear that Taylor's failure to timely serve ,-"HULUUVL was not due to good cause or justified by 
excusable neglect 
Chamberlain. The 
tunc. motion was 
it not have been 
was correct in dismissing Taylor"s claims 
Court was also correct denying Taylor's request for a stay nunc 
well the six month for service and 
interest of the ~U""'U."'-JH proceedings. 
the District Court' s U"'~L>1VH 
August, 12. 
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